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Introduction
During the 20072008 food crisis, commodity prices escalated leading to food insecurity and political instability in the developing world (Timmer, 2010) . Simultaneously an export cartel for fertilizer, an essential input to industrial crop production, established itself and fertilizer prices tripled (Jenny, 2012) . This paper estimates that the cartel directly led to a 40-50% overcharge in the fertilizer market, which through cost passthrough to agriculture translated into up to a 20% increase in food prices. Since food prices rose on average by 40% during the crisis, we can attribute nearly 50% of the price increase to the formation of the fertilizer cartel.
Moreover, while the cartel channel has apparently been overlooked in the literature so far, it can explain not only the severity but also sudden emergence of the food crisis which other explanations such as population growth or high energy prices 1 do not. More generally, our results indicate an urgent need to better understand the role of export cartels in addressing future challenges to food security (Grote, 2014) .
Commensurate to the importance of the food crisis, a large literature is developing to estimate its causes 2 . On the demand side, analysts emphasize population growth and rising per capita meat consumption (Trostle, 2010) . Mitchell (2008) focuses on the role of biofuel subsidies in raising demand for crops, although subsequent research is ambiguous at best (Serra and Zilberman, 2013) . Adverse supply shocks due to high energy prices are a potential explanation (Harri et al., 2009) , although challenged by Zhang et al. (2010) . Bad weather in some regions certainly did not help (Headey and Fan, 2010 , chapter 2), although harvests were not unusually poor during the crisis period. Synchronous low grain stocks, or more precisely low stockto-use ratios is also frequently blamed (Bobenrieth et al., 2013) . Current research and debate largely focuses on determining the relative importance of these causal factors to the food crisis 3 . Additionally, a growing body of research investigates the role of nancial speculation in the food crisis, e.g. Irwin and Sanders (2012) ; Fattouh et al. (2013) ; Sanders and Irwin (2010) , although there is considerable evidence against herd behaviour (Steen and Gjolberg, 2013) . Finally, trade shocks (Headey, 2011) may have been a factor.
Fertilizer has so far been at best at the sidelines of the discussion. While high fertilizer prices during the crisis are sometimes noted, they are often attributed to high energy prices (e.g. Headey and Fan (2010, p. 25) ). Mitchell (2008) notes that energyintensive components of total production costs account for 6.7%13.4% in USDA farm survey data; but we know from economic theory that prices depend on marginal cost in a competitive industry. According to USDA (2014a), the average fertilizer cost share in years 1975-2013 accounted for 32% of the marginal cost of wheat and 37% of the marginal cost of maize.
4 High fertilizer prices can also have adverse impacts on the government budget of developing countries; e.g. Dorward and Chirwa (2011) An appreciation of the role of fertilizer may be crucial to understanding the past food crisis and mitigating future ones. Given the large share of agricultural marginal cost accounted for by fertilizer, strong price passthrough from fertilizer to food is predicted by standard economic theory 5 ; careful econometric analysis is thus needed.
Second, fertilizer prices are at times determined by an international export cartel (Hoekman and Saggi, 2007) or the degree of market concentration (Hernandez and Torero (2013)) and not market forces. Understanding the extent of the cartel overcharge is crucial to estimating the potential eects international competition enforcement against such cartels could have on food markets particularly on developing countries, where households spend roughly half their income on food (Mitchell, 2008) .
Contribution: We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, using established time series methodology (cf. Baes (2010) ; Nazlioglu and Soytas (2011); Zhang et al.
(2010)), we establish the strong cost passthrough from fertilizer to food. Second, we estimate the cartel overcharge (Connor and Bolotova, 2006; Connor, 2010) in the fertilizer market during the crisis period. Finally, we conduct a simulation of food prices in the counterfactual case that no cartel would have been formed and show that the majority of the crisis food price increase can be explained by the fertilizer cartel alone. This paper proceeds by briey presenting the role of fertilizers in modern agriculture and describing the fertilizer market. Subsequently, data and methods are introduced in section 3, succeeded by a discussion of the economic motivation of the regression equation and our the estimation strategy. We present results in section 4, and place them in the context of the literature. Section 5 simulates the development of food prices had no cartel been in place. Robustness checks are collected in section 6. Finally, we conclude.
Fertilizers and Market
Mineral fertilizers -nitrogen, potassium and phosphorus are the key nutrients crucial for plant growth and hence modern agriculture. The increase in use of commercial fertilizers was the main component of the so called green revolution and at least 30 to 50% of crop yield is attributable to commercial fertilizer nutrient inputs 5 See section 3 for details 3 (Stewart et al., 2005) . Currently the world fertilizers market is worth approximately $170 billion annually.
The fertilizer industry is conducive to cartelization, for individual nutrients and all three nutrients together. This feature of the fertilizer industry is based on heavy concentration of the essential mined inputs -potassium and phosphorus -where reserves are being exploited only in few countries and by few rms. Together with the high investment required in mining operations and the presence of export associations such as e.g. PhosChem and Canpotex, the fertilizer industry provides favorable conditions for collusion; indeed, cartel episodes have been documented since the late 19th century (see Taylor and Moss (2013) for a detailed study of the industry). The two latest cartel episodes are described in more details in section 5. Since the main input for nitrogen fertilizer is energy (used to convert atmospheric nitrogen to a nutritionally available form via the Haber-Bosch process), one would expect a higher degree of competitiveness on that market. However, many of the major phosphorus producers also manufacture nitrogen fertilizer, partly because a source of nitrogen is required to stabilize phosphorus, and partly because many fertilizer manufacturers sell blended nitrogen-phosphorus-potash fertilizer at wholesale and retail (Taylor and Moss (2013) . 
Data and Methods
Model Specication: Our interest is in determining the price passthrough from fertilizer and energy indices on food prices. Thus, based on annual time series data, we estimate reduced form regressions explaining food commodity prices as a function of fertilizer and energy indicies, controlling for ination and allowing a linear time trend. This yields the regression model:
where t denotes a year between 1960 and 2013, FERTILIZERS t is the index of fertilizer prices and ENERGY t the index of energy prices; moreover, a price deator, denoted MUV t , US dollar exchange rate USD t and linear time trend t are added as controls. The dependent variable is denoted X t ; in our analysis, we consider a general food price index FOOD as well as prices for main agricultural commodities, wheat and maize, soybeans, barley, sorghum and rice. To facilitate comparison with the existing literature, we also estimate a reduced model where the restriction β 1 = 0 is imposed. Furthermore, similarly to Nazlioglu and Soytas (2011) we present a specication without MUV and similarly to Baes (2010) a model without the exchange rates.
Finally, we estimate the reduced model with the fertilizer index as the dependent variable. Throughout, we use OLS as our estimation method and carefully check for non-stationarities using appropriate versions of the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. We assume that unobserved variables (e.g. other costpush factors such as wages) are uncorrelated with the error term; further properties of the error time series will be subjected to statistical testing below.
This statistical model can be given a structural economic interpretation. Consider a competitive industry, where each rm produces according to a constant returns to scale CobbDouglas production function. Then, the unit marginal cost function has the functional form of (1), allowing for a time trend in total factor producticity and possibly nonneutrality of money (unless β 3 = −β 1 − β 2 ). Coecients β 1 and β 2 can thus be interpreted as the factor weights in the production function; moreover, the predicted cost share of each factor corresponds to the coecients β i . For proof see the appendix.
Data Sources: Our commodity price series is based on the World Bank Global Economic Monitor Commodities database (World Bank, 2014) . We study the broad based food price index (series IFOOD), which includes grains, cereals and oils among other food items as our dependent variable of interest; furthermore, two key commodities maize and wheat are studied separately. Our explanatory variables are the fertilizer index (series IFERTILIZER), which includes all widely used fertilizer types: potassium, nitrogen and phosphate rock, and energy prices (IENERGY index). Individual commodity prices are given in nominal USD; indices are also of nominal prices, with 2010 as the base year. The Manufactured Unit Value (MUV) index, also provided by the World Bank, is included in the regressions as a deator.
Furthermore, we account for USD real exchange rates, based on Breugel Institute's monthly data series 6 (Darvas, 2012) . Data were current as of December 2014. The dataset is closely related to Baes (2010) , who studies the 19602008 period; however, his analysis omits consideration of fertilizer prices as an explanatory variable.
Descriptive Analysis: The starkness of the ongoing food crisis is illustrated in gure 6 Ocial FED USD exchange rates are reported only since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971. FertilizerEnergy Link: Fertilizer and energy price indices are closely linked. This is apparent from visual inspection: from the mid1970s to 2005 or so, energy and fertilizer indices move almost entirely in parallel. This is explained by the fact that fertilizer production is highly energyintensive, be it due to mining (potassium, phosphate rock) or as a direct input (e.g., natural gas in the HaberBosch process). Yet there is independent variation in fertilizer prices: in both 1973/1974 and 2007/2008, fertilizer prices are much higher than one would expect from energy prices. More-6 over, in both of these periods food prices were abnormally high indeed, at crisis levels. It is this variation that underlies the more formal analysis below and allows us to estimate the direct impact of fertilizer prices on food commodities.
Fertilizer Matters
Unit Root Tests: We use the Augmented DickeyFuller (ADF) test testing the null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative of a stationary autoregressive process.
The optimal lag order is determined through the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC); results are presented in table 1. It is evident that for the levels series displayed in the left panel the ADF test largely fails to reject the unit root hypothesis. For the fertilizer and USD, there is weak evidence for stationarity at the 10% level; we consider this signicance level insucient to reject the null. Thus, all levels series are considered to have a unit root. In the right panel, the corresponding ADF test for the rstdierenced series is displayed. Here, results are rather straightforward: the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level for all series. Hence, the evidence suggests that our data follows an I(1) process. The I(1) nding has profound implications for our econometric analysis of model (1). On the one hand, standard errors and the R 2 statistic are biased towards excessive signicance (the spurious regression problem); hence signicance tests need to be interpreted with care. On the other hand, as we show below, the model in fact provides a cointegrating regression; hence the error term t will be stationary and, importantly, OLS parameter estimates are super consistent, i.e. they converge to the population at a faster rate than in an I(0) regression with the same sample size.
Estimation Results: Table 2 collects estimation results. Given the I(1) data, universally high values of adjusted R 2 are expected, therefore the statistics are not reported 7 in the regression tables; encouragingly, we are able to reject statistical signicance of some parameters. In particular, there appears to be essentially no time trend in commodity prices. Moreover, the deator MUV t is mostly insignicant, reaching the 5% level only in few specications. In regressions (1-3) , which include the fertilizer index, there is robust evidence in favor of cointegration. The Augmented Dickey
Fuller test, computed on residuals of the estimated equation, is able to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in all cases at the 5% level. There is mixed evidence regarding cointegration in the restricted model which omits the fertilizer index (specications 4-6). The no cointegration null hypothesis cannot be rejected even at the 10% level in specication (4), in which as in Baes (2010) Fertilizer is a consistently statistically and economically signicant price driver in food markets. Estimates for β 1 range from 0.27 to 0.42 depending on the specication; this implies that a doubling in fertilizer prices would be predicted to lead to at least a 27% increase in food prices. The estimates may, at rst, seem surprisingly high, but they indeed stay very much in line with the fertilizer cost shares in variable costs from the USDA farm cost surveys as shown on gure 2. We compare cost share coecients from the reduced form regressions (see appendix for the regressions tables) and the average fertilizers share in the variable production cost using USDA data for years 7 (USDA (2014a)). The data points on gure 2 lay along the 45
• , which indicates that a nearly perfect match is achieved, thereby conrming 7 The estimates are based on producer surveys conducted about every 4-8 years for each commodity and updated each year with estimates of annual price, acreage, and production changes.
Estimates for non-survey years use the actual survey year as a base and use price indexes and other indicators to reect year-over-year changes. The cost estimates include both cash expenditures and non-cash costs that constitute an economic cost. The USDA cost classication was changing over time. To reconstruct a cost category Total, variable cash expenses available only for the older series, hired labor costs were added to category Total, operating cost. There is mixed evidence supporting statistically signicant eect on food prices once fertilizer is included. This nding is especially striking in light of the spurious regression problem: due to biased standard errors, it may be dicult to reject truly insignicant parameters. The estimates at around 5-13% stay in line with USDA survey suggesting that the combined costs for fuel, lube and electricity account for 9% to 12% of operating costs for the main crops (USDA, 2014a). Note that since commodity prices are generally quoted free on board, the bulk of transportation costs does not enter directly in the data.
8 For the analysis all food commodities for which data are available in both USDA and GEM databases except for rice. The exclusion of rice from the analysis is on both on econometric and economic grounds. The former are due the the fact that we can't reject the hypothesis that rice price is I(0). From more economic perspective, rice markets are very thinly traded and the market price is often driven by import and export regulations and not by the cost factors (see e.g. (Timmer, 2010) ).
The energyfood price link reappears once fertilizer prices are excluded. Our estimates suggest an cost elasticity in the range 0.3 of food prices with respect to the energy index; these ndings are close to earlier estimates in the literature 9 . Combined with the lack of cointegation between energy and food, this suggests that earlier studies which omitted fertilizer may have identied only the indirect impact of energy on food, channeled through higher fertilizer prices.
At an estimated 38-62% cost share (specications 7-9 of table 2), energy prices have a very strong cost passthrough to fertilizer prices. Due to the energyintensive production of fertilizers with energy costs accounting for up to 90% of nitrogen fertilizer cost (Headey and Fan, 2010, p. 25 ) the estimate is plausible. Impact on the Food Crisis: The fertilizer cartel can potentially explain up to a halve of food price increases during the crisis time. According to our earlier estimates, Note: * p<0.1; * * p<0.05; * * * p<0.01
ADF stands for ADF test statistic on residuals of the long run model. the 42-51% fertilizer cartel overcharge would be expected to lead to a 12-21% 11 increase in food prices. Given the observed increase in the food price index of 40%, our model attributes 29-53% of the crisis price hike to the fertilizer cartel. 
Robustness Checks
To assert a robust impact of fertilizer prices on food commodities we replace the food price index with the main food commodities as the dependent variable in equation 1. More specically, we test the following commodities: wheat, maize, soybeans, barley, sorghum and rice. Similarly as in section 4 we proceed with stationarity tests reported in the appendix. As we can't reject the hypothesis about stationarity of the rice price time series we limit our attention to the remaining commodities in the cointegrating regression. The regression results suggest a strong impact of fertilizer consistent across specications and commodities. In all specications the coecient on fertilizer is highly signicant and in line with the USDA cost survey data presented on gure 2. Furthermore, the ADF test on residuals suggests the existence of a cointegrating vector between the commodities. Results of specication (1) from table 2 are presented in columns (1-5), specication (2) in columns (6-10) and specication (3) in columns (11-15) of the table in the appendix.
In addition to those three specications, stock-to-use ratios for each of the commodities have been added to the regression. The availability of storing technology distorts the standard Marshallian supply-demand cross (Wright, 2011) . Although, the stationarity of commodity prices suggests that food stocks are not used as an investment device for arbitrage opportunity seeking investors, the distortions caused by state buer stocks cannot be excluded. Therefore, similarly to Baes and Dennis (2013) we include the stock-to-use ratio directly in the regression framework 12 . The estimates on stock-to-use ratio are potentially biased due to endogeneity problems, however good instruments were not available to us. Except for wheat, stock-to-use ratios for all commodities are I(1) we include them in the cointegrating regression.
Results presented in specications (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) in the appendix show that while being highly signicant and negatively correlated with commodity prices, stock-to-use ratios do not aect the coecients on fertilizers. This suggests that any endogenity problems in the stock-use-ratio do not aect our estimates of the fertilizer eect.
The broad range of regressions performed robustly show the importance of fertilizers in determining food prices. For each of the ve food commodities, in each of the four regression specications fertilizers persistently prove to be a major cost contributor of food commodity prices. Importantly, the changes in the specications do not signicantly aect the estimates of the fertilizer eect.
Conclusion
Since the Green Revolution, the increased application of fertilizer has been instrumental in raising crop yields worldwide. But, as this paper shows, this dependence on fertilizer is not merely technological, but economic: high fertilizer prices directly translate into high food prices. This link is crucial to our understanding of the recent food crisis, during which prices rose by 40% on average. We estimate this was largely caused by the formation of an international export cartel for fertilizers. According to our model, the cartel overcharge in the fertilizer market amounted to nearly 50%.
This directly led to a 26% increase in the food price index. In other words, the formation of the fertilizer cartel explains up to a halve of the crisis price increase.
While many factors doubtlessly contributed to the food crisis, we believe the role of fertilizer should be taken seriously. First, while our results are stark, they are in line with the related literature. We estimate fertilizer cost passthrough from aggregate time series data running many years; but the share of fertilizer in marginal 12 We calculate stock-to-use ratio following the methodology and data (USDA, 2014b) as suggested by Bobenrieth et al. (2013) cost implied by our model is close to estimates obtained from production budgets and farmer surveys. Our estimated cartel overcharge of 42-51% is typical for international export cartels. Finally, we control for energy prices; according to our estimates, food prices would certainly have been high in 2007/2008 due to the simultaneous energy crisis but they would not have reached crisis levels.
These results highlight the importance of addressing fertilizer cartel the OPEC of world potash markets (Scherer, 1996) in combating food crises. In recent history, various export cartels have at dierent times dominated the fertilizer market (cf.
al Rawashdeh and Maxwell (2014) ; e.g. Newman (1948) discusses the role of the German potassium cartel in the Nazi economy). These cartels ourished, with either explicit or implicit state backing, because of the absence of eective international competition authorities and enforcement (Marquis, 2014) 13 . Sokol (2008) discusses possible institutional reforms to mitigate export cartels; Taylor and Moss (2013) make the case for global antitrust enforcement in the fertilizer industry.
Perhaps above all, this paper is a call for further research. Since the fertilizer hypothesis is new, it is in need of further corroboration for additional food commodities and from other datasets. The recommended steps include data disaggregation.
The analysis performed on the indices may miss some important subtleties of the fertilizer and energy markets. It would be very valuable for the agricultural policy to understand the co-movement of prices of nitrogen, potassium and phosphorus fertilizers. Furthermore, the recent dramatic shocks to the fertilizers markets caused by the cartel formation and the signicant decrease of natural gas prices may help to identify the links between the dierent fertilizer types. Furthermore, a focus on the oil and natural gas prices rather than the analysis compound index would allow to separate the eect of cartel formation from the recent processes that change the shape of the relation between food, energy and fertilizer prices -the introduction of the fracking technology and the recent increase in the use of biofuels. Finally, we treated fertilizer cartel formation as exogenous; but a better understanding of the reasons for success and breakdowns in fertilizer cartels over time is sorely needed. Note: * p<0.1; * * p<0.05; * * * p<0.01 
